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1877 
THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION FOR 
ADMITTING STATES 
Roderick M. Hills Jr.* 
 
The United States has experimented with several different constitutions for 
adding states.  Of all of these regimes, the shortest lived was also the one 
selected by the Federalist drafters of the Constitution.  Under this regime, 
Article IV, Section 3 bestowed on Congress broad power to govern new 
territories as colonies of the original states, allowing Congress to place any 
conditions that they pleased on their admissions.  This regime was created 
by Federalists, like Gouvernour Morris, who were suspicious of Scots-Irish 
frontiersmen and eager to settle western territory using land companies who 
would insure that new settlers were deferential to Federalist leadership back 
east and loyal to the national government.  Whatever its merits in terms of 
text and original understanding, however, the Federalist constitution of 
company towns was quickly supplanted by a constitution of popular 
sovereignty.  Initially devised by the Northern Democratic Party between 
1845 and the Civil War to overcome intraparty divisions over slavery, the 
Republican Party preserved the basic structure of popular sovereignty after 
the Civil War to become the unwritten constitution for adding states today.  
Our national experience with the constitution of state admissions is that 
cross-partisan constitutional conventions, not text or original understanding, 
are the real foundations of durable constitutional rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
James Pfander and Elena Joffroy have provided this Symposium with a 
fascinating and important account of how unwritten constitutional 
conventions can supplant constitutional text.1  As they explain, the “now 
existing” clause of Article I, Section 9 “empowered Congress to restrict the 
geographic scope of slavery and to use new state admission legislation to 
condition statehood in ways that could enforce the prohibition of slavery.”2  
 
*  William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University Law School.  This Essay 
was prepared for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham 
Law Review on October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.  This Essay is, I hope, 
much better as a result of the insightful comments I received from Gregory Ablavsky, Don 
Herzog, James E. Pfander, Rick Pildes, Richard Primus, David Schwartz, and the participants 
at this Symposium. 
 
 1. James E. Pfander & Elena Joffroy, Equal Footing and the States “Now Existing”:  
Slavery & State Equality over Time, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975 (2021). 
 2. See id. at 1978. 
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This power, however, was stripped away after ratification through the 
gradual adoption by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court of the so-called 
“equal footing” doctrine—the idea that, because new states must be admitted 
on equal terms with existing states, Congress cannot condition the admission 
of the former on the new states’ prohibiting slavery.  This triumph of 
unwritten convention over the express text of Article I, Section 9 is all the 
more striking because the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention expressly 
excised the guarantee of equal footing from the “Admission Clause” of 
Article IV, Section 3.  That “equal footing” has limited Congress’s powers is 
not merely an instance of an unwritten convention’s taking precedence over 
express text; it is also an instance of a convention’s rising up from the grave, 
like an unkillable zombie after having been expressly interred by 
constitutional drafters. 
In what follows, I will supplement Pfander and Joffroy’s account with an 
explanation for why “equal footing” could prove so durable despite being so 
inconsistent with constitutional text.  As I explain below (and at greater 
length in another article), equal footing, together with the related principle of 
popular sovereignty, helps solve a problem of political risk created by Article 
IV’s conferring on Congress the power to add new states to the Union by a 
simple majority vote.  As explained in Part I, I agree with Pfander and Joffroy 
that Congress’s admission power under Article IV, Section 3 was likely 
intended to be an unlimited power.  Indeed, the best reading of the original 
Federalist Constitution is that Congress enjoyed the power to rule western 
states as colonies without any limits on such power rooted in new states’ 
alleged “equal footing” to existing states. 
As I explain in Part II, however, this unlimited power proved to be a 
political headache for Congress, because it created the risk that parties in 
Congress could splinter over the terms under which new states were 
admitted.  Because such new states each earn two senators upon admission 
to the Union regardless of population, the addition of new states can radically 
change the balance of power in Congress.  The equal footing doctrine and the 
related principle of popular sovereignty helped control this political 
uncertainty by delegating decisions about sensitive issues like slavery, aid 
for church schools, and noncitizens’ and women’s suffrage to the voters of 
prospective states.  These were all issues over which political parties were 
internally divided.  The convention of having the voters of a prospective state 
decide on the terms of the state’s admission allowed the majority party in 
Congress to avoid taking positions on such sensitive issues while still 
allowing admission of new states likely to elect senators belonging to that 
majority party. 
Do equal footing and popular sovereignty count as constitutional law?  
Measured against the original Federalist Constitution, certainly not.  Nor can 
these principles be explained by abstractions like the notion of “equal 
sovereignty” invoked in Shelby County v. Holder.3  As Professor Peter 
 
 3. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
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Westen argued decades ago, “equality” writ large is essentially empty.4  In 
particular, as explained in Part III, equal sovereignty cannot explain why 
Congress and the Court embraced its particular versions of equal footing and 
popular sovereignty, while discarding rival versions that were equally 
plausible from the standpoint of abstract equality.  Instead, the doctrine and 
convention are best explained as the product of partisan self-interest:  because 
equal footing and popular sovereignty provide a cross-partisan benefit that is 
useful to whichever party happens to control the national government, these 
principles have staying power that the Court can exploit to fashion doctrine 
useful to Congress.  In effect, the Court provides Congress with a helping 
hand, not a judicial constraint, in enforcing equal footing as a supplement to 
the principle of popular sovereignty.5  More generally, one can argue that this 
is how constitutional law is made—as a compromise to induce political 
stability, not as formal enactments dreamed up at a magical moment of 
ratification.  Constitutional text that cannot produce that necessary stability 
is discarded, and unwritten doctrines like equal footing and popular 
sovereignty take its place. 
I.  THE ORIGINAL FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION OF UNLIMITED 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Pfander and Joffroy provide a succinct and convincing account of how 
Gouverneur Morris eliminated any reference to equal footing from Article 
IV of the original Constitution.6  In brief, the Constitution, as originally 
written, represented a compromise under which new states would gain 
representation in Congress equal to existing states, but Congress would also 
enjoy unlimited power to dictate the terms under which new states would be 
admitted.7 
Pfander and Joffroy speculate that Morris pressed for such broad 
congressional power because granting newly admitted states equal footing 
with the original states would allow the spread of slavery.8  Morris and other 
Federalists, however, had another more immediate and self-interested reason 
to give Congress plenary power over the admission of new states carved out 
of western territories:  they distrusted intensely the economic incentives and 
 
 4. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982). 
 5. For expositions of various models of judicial review that explain judicial constraints 
on the legislature as aids in stabilizing coalitions by making commitments to interest groups 
credible or by removing divisive issues from the legislative agenda, see Howard Gillman, 
Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW & POLITICS 
1 (Keith Whittington et al. eds., 2008); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:  
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Matthew 
Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”:  The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial 
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003); Keith Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”:  
Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005). 
 6. Pfander & Joffroy, supra note 1, at 1977. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1987. 
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political motivations of the disproportionately Scots-Irish settlers who were 
streaming into the Ohio River Valley.  The Scots-Irish had a reputation for 
violently feuding with each other, against neighboring Indian tribes, and 
occasionally even against eastern authorities, as well as for subsistence 
farming with little investment in improvements and small hope of producing 
a surplus for transatlantic export.9  Federalists repeatedly denounced these 
squatters on the public domain as “a parcel of banditti, who will bid defiance 
to all authority,” “the Indigent and Ignorant,” and even “white Indians.”10  
Easterners, even Virginians like Senator William Grayson, preferred the 
more economically profitable New England style of “progressive seating,” 
in which settlers filled up “compact” settlements in towns before the 
hinterlands were open to the market.11  “I dread the cold and sower Temper 
of the back Counties,” Morris confided to George Washington in a letter, a 
sentiment likely shared by the would-be Virginian landlord of the western 
“Banditti.”12 
By giving Congress plenary power to place conditions on the admission of 
new states, Morris and other Federalists could ensure that new states would 
not be admitted until they were populated by more people deemed more 
orderly and economically productive than the Scots-Irish.13  When Morris, 
on August 29, 1803, successfully moved for the deletion of “equality” 
language from Article IV, he preserved eastern power over western 
settlement, thereby controlling the political power of Scots-Irish squatters 
whom he deeply distrusted.  This congressional control, however, was 
 
 9. KEVIN T. BARKSDALE, THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN:  AMERICA’S FIRST SECESSION 3 
(2009); DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED:  FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 
605–782 (1989); ERIC HINDRAKER & PETER C. MANCALL, AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE:  THE 
BACKCOUNTRY IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 125–60 (2003) (describing the siege of 
Philadelphia by western “Paxton Boys”); BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’ EMPIRE:  
COLONIALISM AND STATE FORMATION IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST 55–79 (2015); Franḉois 
Furstenberg, The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History, 113 AM. 
HIST. REV. 647, 659 (2008) (describing the “ambiguous loyalties of western colonists”).  On 
the regulators’ rebellion in the Carolinas, see generally MARJOLEINE KARS, BREAKING LOOSE 
TOGETHER:  THE REGULATOR REBELLION IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY NORTH CAROLINA (2002). 
 10. PETER ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION:  A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
16–17, 21, 25, 29–30 (1987); see also ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE FRONTIER REPUBLIC:  
IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE OHIO COUNTRY, 1780–1825, at 6–8 (1986). 
 11. ONUF, supra note 10, at 31, 37, 40, 43.  On Virginians’ acceptance of the New England 
system for settling land as superior to the Virginian system of “indiscriminate location,” see 
PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE:  THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL 
EXPANSION 52 (2017). 
 12. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to George Washington (Oct. 30, 1787), in 1 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 513, 513 (John P. Kaminski et 
al. eds., 1981). 
 13. As I explain in a longer article, many Federalists pinned their hopes on the Ohio Land 
Company, a corporation chartered by the Confederation Congress while the Philadelphia 
Convention was debating the status of western lands.  Led by New England ministers and 
Revolutionary War officers, the Ohio Company proposed to settle industrious and deferential 
New Englanders in the Ohio River Valley to the exclusion of unruly Scots-Irish squatters. 
Roderick M. Hills Jr., Our Unwritten Constitution of Empire:  Doctrines and Conventions for 
Adding (and Not Adding) States 11–13 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
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qualified by those new states’ immediately obtaining equal representation in 
Congress.  As he later explained to Henry Livingston during the 
congressional debates over the government of the new Louisiana territory, he 
“always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would 
be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our 
councils.”14  But he admitted that, “[i]n wording the third section of the fourth 
article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the 
exclusion,” conceding that “had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong 
opposition would have been made.”15  Professor Thomas Colby has argued 
that this letter suggests that the Convention left the scope of Congress’s 
powers undecided.16  In light of the entire Convention debates over the status 
of western states, however, the letter points to precisely the compromise 
described by Pfander and Joffroy:  new states, contrary to Morris’s fondest 
hopes, would receive equal voice in our councils, but Morris secured in return 
a delegation of unlimited power to Congress to place conditions on a state’s 
admission.17  That was a compromise that “went as far as circumstances 
would permit” to limit what Morris took to be the ill effects of such equal 
congressional representation on the original states.18 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, 1845–1912 
That equal “voice in our councils” would eventually undermine Morris’s 
compromise.  As explained in more detail below, equal representation in the 
Senate created hydraulic pressure for both political parties in Congress to 
enforce principles of equal footing and popular sovereignty in admission 
conditions, setting aside the quasi-colonial congressional control over the 
west envisioned by Morris. 
Despite being contested, Congress’s plenary power to impose any 
conditions it pleased on the admission of new states was, prior to 1845, 
initially recognized by both Congress and the Court.  This recognition was 
not undisputed:  as Pfander and Joffroy note, Southerners contested 
Missouri’s admission on the condition that slavery be prohibited within its 
territory by invoking the equal footing principle.19  Even earlier, Tennessee 
politicians seeking control over federal lands unsuccessfully pressed the idea 
that equal footing entitled new states to ownership of the federal public 
domain within their boundaries.20  Alabama Senator John McKinley renewed 
this same version of equal footing in the late 1820s when seeking 
 
 14. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 523, 523 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Thomas Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 
1103 (2016) (“The most that can be comfortably said about the framing history, then, is that 
the Framers chose not to resolve the equal footing issue explicitly at the Convention.”). 
 17. Pfander & Joffroy, supra note 1, at 1985. 
 18. Id. at 1984. 
 19. Id. at 1996. 
 20. Hills, supra note 13, at 19–20. 
1882 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
“retrocession” of federal land to new state governments.21  Later, as a 
Supreme Court Justice, McKinley actually persuaded a majority of the Court 
to endorse a version of this principle in Pollard v. Hagan.22 
The dominant position, however, was that Congress could unilaterally 
impose conditions on new states’ admission regardless of whether these 
conditions deprived states of powers enjoyed by the original members of the 
Union.  When Louisiana was admitted in 1812, for instance, Congress, 
suspicious of the new state’s francophone and Roman Catholic residents, 
enacted an enabling act requiring that the new state government use English, 
crimes be tried by jury, and civil and religious liberties be protected.23  The 
Supreme Court gave Congress complete power to unilaterally impose 
draconian conditions on new states in Green v. Biddle,24 when the Court 
upheld the condition that all land title in Kentucky was governed by Virginia 
law, because such a legal regime was required by the compact approved by 
Congress under which Kentucky was admitted to the Union.25 
By the mid-1840s, however, the original consensus about Congress’s 
power was shattered by the sectional controversy over slavery.  After the 
conquest of the western United States following the Mexican-American War, 
Congress faced the problem of admitting states carved from this new 
territory.  Deciding on the conditions for admission placed each political 
party, Whig and Democratic, in a dilemma:  should the new state constitution 
allow or prohibit slavery?  Since each party drew from both Northern and 
Southern constituencies, banning or allowing slavery in new states threatened 
to tear the political parties apart.  To duck this volatile issue, Democratic 
politicians developed the principles of equal footing and popular sovereignty.  
They took the position that it was up to the people of the prospective state to 
decide by popular vote whether or not to adopt a prohibition on slavery in 
their state constitution.  As then representative Stephen Douglas declared in 
1845 while supporting the admission of Iowa and Florida, Douglas did not 
need “to go into a discussion of the slavery question, or the propriety of the 
various provisions of the constitutions of Iowa and Florida” because “[t]he 
people of each State are to form their constitution in their own way and in 
accordance with their own views, subject to one restriction only; and that 
was, it should be republican in its character.”26 
Equal footing as a solution to intraparty strife came in different varieties.  
Douglas’s version of equal footing in the Florida-Iowa debate was especially 
strong insofar as he urged that Congress could not demand any condition but 
 
 21. Id. at 27. 
 22. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
 23. Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. 21, §§ 1–4, 2 Stat. 641, 641–43. On the debates over 
Louisiana’s admission, see PETER J. KASTOR, THE NATION’S CRUCIBLE:  THE LOUISIANA 
PURCHASE AND THE CREATION OF AMERICA 143–47 (2004). 
 24. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
 25. Hills, supra note 13, at 22–23. 
 26. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 273, 284 (1845); see also Hills, supra note 13, at 
34. 
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a republican form of government as the price of admission.27  Almost 
simultaneously, the Supreme Court adopted a weaker version in Permoli v. 
Municipality No. 1,28 stating that any conditions contained in the federal 
enabling act under which Louisiana was admitted could not be enforced to 
limit the state government’s power after admission.  The condition in 
question protected Father Permoli’s religious liberty (he had been barred 
from holding an open casket funeral by a local health law), but the principle 
plainly limited Congress’s powers unilaterally to impose antislavery 
conditions on new states through federal statutes.  According to Permoli, “all 
[such conditions were] superseded by the state constitution,” lacking any 
legal “force, unless they were adopted by the constitution of Louisiana, as 
laws of the state.”29  Permoli’s version of equal footing was weaker than 
Douglas’s version:  the Court acknowledged that an enabling act from 
Congress could demand any provisions that Congress pleased from a 
proposed state constitution and turn down prospective states that refused to 
adopt such limits.30  Rather than limiting what conditions Congress could 
impose, Permoli simply limited how Congress could enforce them.  Congress 
could reject a prospective state’s request for admission altogether for any 
reason, but Congress could not admit a state based on conditions contained 
only in a federal statute that the state’s people had not also ratified in a 
popular referendum. 
Permoli’s version of equal footing gradually was accepted as the 
governing standard for admissions of new states.  One major step toward 
such acceptance was Stephen Douglas’s showdown with President James 
Buchanan over the admission of Kansas in December of 1857.  President 
Buchanan sought to push a bill through Congress admitting Kansas to 
statehood under a state constitution proposed by proslavery delegates 
meeting in Lecompton, Kansas.  The Lecompton Convention, however, was 
not fairly elected and did not represent the dominant free-state sentiment in 
Kansas.31  President Buchanan nevertheless endorsed the admission of 
 
 27. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 273, 284 (explaining that Douglas “had doubts as 
to the power of Congress to reject a State, being now a part of the territory of the United States, 
merely on account of her peculiar domestic institutions,” because “whenever a new State was 
admitted into the Union, it came in on an equal footing, in all respects, with the original States; 
and all attempts to deprive her of that equality, by act of Congress, was in derogation of the 
constitution of the United States, and consequently void”). 
 28. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). 
 29. Id. at 610.  The three statutes were:  Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, 2 Stat. 322, under 
which the Territory of Orleans was created; Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641; and Act 
of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 701, under which Louisiana was admitted to the Union. Id. at 
594–95. 
 30. Id. at 609 (declaring that Louisiana’s enabling act “declare[d] in advance, to the people 
of the territory, the fundamental principles their constitution should contain,” which “was 
every way proper under the circumstances” and that, after a proposed state was “formed, and 
presented,” Congress had the power only to “judge whether it contained the proper principles, 
and to accept it if it did or reject it if it did not”). 
 31. NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS:  CONTESTED LIBERTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
141–42, 144–45 (2004); 2 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION:  SECESSIONISTS 
TRIUMPHANT, 1854–1861, at 133 (2007); ROY NICHOLS, THE DISRUPTION OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 119–20, 130, 147 (1948). 
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Kansas on the basis of this document, simply as a way to placate the South 
and resolve the slavery question in Kansas quickly.  In a stunning repudiation 
of party loyalty, Douglas defied Buchanan in a speech on December 9, 1857, 
demanding respect for “the great principle of self-government, which left the 
people of each State and each Territory free to form and regulate their 
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the 
United States.”32 
Douglas emerged from this showdown victorious and popular,33 and his 
eventual victory in this showdown established an important precedent in 
support of popular sovereignty:  the state constitution that formed the basis 
for admission of a state to the Union had to be approved by the people of the 
state and not simply custom-tailored by Congress.  Both sides of the aisle, 
from Abraham Lincoln to proslavery “fire-eaters” like Preston Brooks, 
acknowledged the force of his principle, grudgingly conceding that the 
people of Kansas had the right to admission on their own terms.34 
The Republican Party had self-interested reasons to endorse equal footing 
and popular sovereignty.  Like the Democrats, they faced the threat of 
intraparty schism if Congress took stances on issues over which the national 
party was divided.  By delegating such questions to local voters, the 
Republicans could duck the sensitive issue, maintain party unity, and still 
admit a state likely to vote for Republican senators.  The benefits of popular 
sovereignty and equal footing became apparent as early as 1857, when 
Congress debated the admission of Minnesota.  Based on support from 
German-American residents in the eastern part of the state, Minnesotans had 
submitted a state constitution permitting noncitizens to vote.  The Republican 
Party, however, was exceedingly reluctant to take any position on 
noncitizens’ suffrage.  Competing with the anti-immigrant Know-Nothing 
Party for voters, it was to the Republican advantage to rely on a neutral 
principle by which to duck the question.  Popular sovereignty provided the 
 
 32. Senator Stephen Douglas, Speech on the President’s Message (Dec. 9, 1857). 
 33. On the popularity of Douglas’s stance in Illinois, see NICHOLS, supra note 31, at 171.  
Of Lincoln’s three opponents in 1860, Douglas was by far the most successful, winning 1.3 
million votes to Southern candidate John C. Breckenridge’s 850,000.  Leading conservative 
Republicans in the east took notice, actively courting Douglas to jump ship and join the 
Republicans. See Allen C. Guelzo, Houses Divided:  Lincoln, Douglas, and the Political 
Landscape of 1858, 94 J. AM. HIST. 391, 396 (2007). 
 34. As Representative Preston Brooks stated, “should the people of Kansas comply with 
the terms of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as I understand it, and apply for admission as a free 
State, they will encounter no obstacle in my vote.” CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 108 
(1856) (statement of Rep. Preston Brooks).  Lincoln endorsed the power of Kansas settlers to 
adopt a state constitution protective of slavery in the joint debate with Stephen Douglas at 
Freeport, on August 27, 1858. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES:  THE FIRST COMPLETE, 
UNEXPURGATED TEXT 94 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993) (“[I]f slavery shall be kept out of the 
Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, 
having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the constitution, do such an 
extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the 
institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the 
Union.”). 
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perfect method:  whatever the merits of the Minnesotans’ proposal, they had 
a right to decide the issue for themselves.35 
Following the Civil War, Republicans repeatedly discovered the benefits 
of relying on equal footing and popular sovereignty to duck issues that could 
divide the party while still admitting underpopulated states that could expand 
Republican control in the Senate.  In every case of postbellum admissions, 
they followed the practice, beginning with the admission of Iowa in 1846, of 
requiring voters to approve the proposed state constitution in a referendum.  
Such referenda were not mere formalities; they could materially slow the 
admission of states from which Republicans hoped to win electoral 
advantages.  Voters in Colorado and Nebraska, for instance, refused to 
approve state constitutions in September of 1864, thereby frustrating the 
Republican Party’s leadership in Congress who wanted to admit these two 
states in time for their electoral votes to count in the 1864 presidential 
elections.36  Congressional Republicans also could not dictate terms to local 
voters, because those voters were sometimes happy to refuse admission to 
the Union on terms most preferred by the Republican Party.  New Mexico’s 
Republican territorial leadership, for instance, drafted a proposed state 
constitution in 1889 that banned public aid to church schools in hopes of 
inducing anti-Catholic Republicans in Congress to favor admission.37  The 
price of this concession to national opinion, however, was forfeiture of local 
voters’ support:  hostility from Hispanic and Roman Catholic voters helped 
to defeat the measure in the required referendum.38  For other states, 
Republicans in Congress succeeded in pressuring local voters to accede to 
federal conditions.  Mormons in Utah Territory had to prove that they had 
been thoroughly “Americanized” by rejecting polygamy before Utah could 
be admitted as a state.39 
The postbellum version of popular sovereignty and equal footing adopted 
by Republicans, in short, was the weak version first described by Permoli.  
Congress could impose any conditions it pleased on the admission of new 
states, but those conditions had to be ratified by the voters in the prospective 
state.  In some sense, this was hardly equal footing at all.  After all, there was 
nothing equal about the various terms under which New Mexico and Utah 
were admitted to the Union.  Congress’s willingness to impose unequal, 
custom-tailored conditions on the admission of new states led William 
Dunning to conclude in 1888 that the equal footing doctrine had not, in fact, 
 
 35. For the debate over Minnesota’s admission, see CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 
808–14, 849–65, 872–77 (1857). 
 36. HOWARD R. LAMAR, THE FAR SOUTHWEST, 1846–1912:  A TERRITORIAL HISTORY, 
219–22 (2000); Earl S. Pomeroy, Lincoln, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Admission of 
Nevada, 12 PAC. HIST. REV. 362, 364 (1943). 
 37. ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD, 1846–1912, at 160–61 
(1968). 
 38. Id. at 167–68. 
 39. See generally GUSTAVE O. LARSON, THE “AMERICANIZATION” OF UTAH FOR 
STATEHOOD (1970). 
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won acceptance as a constitutional principle.40  Dunning’s mistake, however, 
was to misunderstand the equality guaranteed by Permoli, which insured 
only that local voters would each enjoy equal power to decline the unequal 
terms on which Congress offered admission and to limit Congress to the 
single remedy of refusing admission to voters who rejected those terms.  
Paired together in this way, equal footing and popular sovereignty formed a 
consistent constitutional convention governing every state from the 
admission of Iowa in 1846 to the admission of New Mexico in 1912. 
III.  EQUAL FOOTING AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS SELF-ENFORCING 
CONVENTIONS 
What explains and justifies equal footing and popular sovereignty as 
principles for our constitution for state admissions?  Lawyers naturally are 
tempted to derive these from principles embedded in the text, purpose, 
history, or structure of the Constitution.  As Pfander and Joffroy show, 
however, the text and original understanding of the Constitution are flatly 
inconsistent with equal footing and popular sovereignty.  What about more 
abstract constitutional principles embedded loosely in the concepts of state 
sovereignty and equality?  As explained below, the idea that equal footing 
and popular sovereignty can be derived from some abstract principle of 
“equal state sovereignty” is unsustainable.  Instead, the doctrine and 
convention are best explained by cross-partisan self-interest that led to a 
durable constitutional practice. 
A.  The Empty Idea of Equal State Sovereignty 
Consider, first, why equal state sovereignty cannot explain equal footing 
or popular sovereignty.41  The problem with any such explanation is that the 
concept of equal state sovereignty cannot differentiate between the very 
specific notions of equal footing and popular sovereignty that have won 
congressional and judicial endorsement from all of the other versions that 
have been consigned to historical oblivion.  Equal state sovereignty is, like 
equality itself, an empty concept that can accommodate many different limits 
on Congress’s Article IV admission power.42  To explain the specific 
concepts that we actually have, one must turn to some other concepts. 
Consider why equal state sovereignty, understood in the abstract, cannot 
explain the strangely attenuated concept of equal footing followed by the 
Court and Congress.  Congress may not limit a state’s equal footing with 
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terms in a federal enabling act that prospectively limit a new state’s powers. 
Congress may, however, condition a prospective state’s admission on that 
prospective state’s having a state constitution specified by Congress.  As 
stated in Coyle v. Smith,43 the canonical statement of the principle is that 
“[t]he constitutional provision concerning the admission of new states is not 
a mandate, but a power to be exercised with discretion” such that “Congress 
may require, under penalty of denying admission, that the organic law of a 
new state at the time of admission shall be such as to meet its approval.”44  
Thus, Congress could (for instance) admit Oklahoma only on the condition 
that Oklahoma’s constitution mandate that the state capital be located in 
Guthrie. 
It is, at least at first glance, a little perplexing why such completely 
permissible “conditions precedent” are not a blatant denial of the equal 
sovereignty that purportedly justifies the equal footing doctrine.  After all, 
the original states were merely required to ratify the original U.S. 
Constitution pursuant to that document’s Article VII.  Why, then, should an 
outside authority dictate the content of the newer-admitted states’ 
constitutions as those states’ price of admission to the federal Union? 
Coyle’s only justification for Congress’s unfettered discretion to condition 
admission on a congressionally approved state constitution is that such limits 
on a state’s sovereignty are not federal limits at all but instead self-imposed 
restrictions based on state law:  “A Constitution thus supervised by Congress 
would, after all, be a Constitution of a state, and as such subject to alteration 
and amendment by the state after admission.  Its force would be that of a state 
Constitution, and not that of an act of Congress.”45  As an exposition of any 
deep principle of equal state sovereignty, these two sentences leave 
something to be desired:  they combine tautology with a question-begging 
assertion.  Of course, a constitution dictated by Congress counts as “a 
Constitution of a state” if one stipulates that it is not “an act of Congress.”  
But if Congress practically dictates the terms of such a document, then in 
what practical sense is such a document the sovereign decision of “the state”?  
Moreover, such a document being “subject to alteration and amendment by 
the state after admission” depends entirely on the content of the document 
being dictated by Congress.  Congress made admission of New Mexico 
contingent on the new state’s submitting for popular ratification an 
amendment making easier the process for amending the state constitution.46  
Congress could presumably make an opposite demand, insisting on an 
especially onerous amendment procedure.  What deep unwritten principle 
explains why such congressional entrenchment of a congressionally designed 
state constitution is not a denial of equal state sovereignty? 
The emptiness of equal state sovereignty becomes apparent when one 
surveys the varieties of state equality that have been rejected by Congress 
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and the Court.  Tennessee insisted that equality required that they be admitted 
with the same right to land as the original states, which would require the 
federal public domain to be ceded to new states upon admission.  Senator and 
later Justice McKinley reiterated this version of equality in the late 1820s and 
again in Pollard.  Congress and the Court, however, had consistently rejected 
this principle of equality, not because it could not be defended as a logical 
deduction from the abstraction of equal state sovereignty but rather because 
eliminating the federal public domain would prevent the federal government 
from providing public goods ranging from forts to railroads that the political 
nation desired. 
Likewise, equal state sovereignty cannot explain the rejection of the 
broader form of equal footing initially championed by Stephen Douglas, 
under which new states can be refused admission only if their proposed 
constitution does not constitute a republican form of government.  This form 
of equality was repeatedly defended by Democrats in the debates over 
admission of Florida and Iowa, but it was soundly rejected by the political 
practice of Republican congresses following the Civil War.  As an exposition 
of equal state sovereignty, Douglas’s theory of state equality seems superior 
to the equal footing doctrine that actually has governed the admission of new 
states.  After all, the original states were not required to surrender polygamy 
or the recall of state judges as a price of admission.  Why should newer states 
have to incorporate such limits into their constitutions?  Coyle and Permoli, 
however, both brusquely ignored such logic, instead holding that Congress 
can custom-tailor unique conditions for the admission of each state, just so 
long as such conditions are enforced “under penalty of denying admission” 
rather than through specific performance of the terms contained in enabling 
acts after admission.47 
In short, there is likely no concept of equality writ large that can distinguish 
between the sorts of equal footing that Congress and the Court have rejected 
and those that eventually won acceptance.  This does not mean that “equality 
talk” was unimportant in the development of our constitution of empire.  To 
the contrary, partisans have repeatedly invoked equal footing and equal 
sovereignty as rhetoric for defending their particular conceptions of equality.  
To determine which versions prevailed and which failed, however, one must 
look to a principle with more differentiating power. 
B.  Cross-Partisan Congressional Self-Interest and Constitutional 
Conventions 
Consider another explanation for our constitution of empire rooted in 
institutional self-interest.  Equal footing is better explained as the product of 
partisan competition rather than any inference from the empty concept of 
equal state sovereignty.  Because each party perceives an advantage in 
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admitting states likely to favor them in the Senate, partisan competition tends 
over time to expand admission.48 
Equal footing and popular sovereignty, however, let each party pursue 
partisan advantage without risking intraparty fracture by reducing divisions 
over divisive issues like slavery, alien suffrage, and aid to religious schools.  
The principle of popular sovereignty was essentially conjured up in the mid-
1840s as a constitutional requirement to prevent the antebellum Democratic 
Party from splitting into irreconcilable Northern and Southern factions.  The 
Whig and Republican parties likewise also saw immediate advantages to 
ducking sensitive issues by delegating them to local voters, such as the 
question of noncitizens’ suffrage, which was also a matter on which Whigs 
and Republicans faced existential challenge from the Know-Nothing Party.  
By delegating the resolution of this issue to territorial voters, Republicans 
could insulate themselves from nativist divisions that would destroy their 
party just as surely as divisions over slavery would destroy the democracy. 
The Republicans’ continuation of popular sovereignty after the Civil War, 
therefore, was a rational partisan strategy rather than loyalty to a mere 
precedent.  Repeatedly, Republicans were confronted with local party 
organizations holding positions at variance with significant parts of the 
national party.  In New Mexico, the question was public aid for Catholic 
schools, while in Wyoming, the issue was female suffrage.  Invoking the 
constitutional entitlement of local voters to resolve such issues by a popular 
vote was a convenient way to avoid splitting the party over such issues.  As 
New York’s senator Thomas Platt stated in 1890 during the debate over 
Wyoming’s admission, he himself was opposed to female suffrage but this 
“is a question which these men and these women in Wyoming have a right 
to determine for themselves.”49  Rebutting Missouri Democratic Senator 
George Vest who sought to split the Republicans over the question, Platt 
invoked the Democrats’ own invention of local popular sovereignty, 
proclaiming that he was “surprised that gentlemen who are so devoted to 
home rule as a sacred right” would try to exclude Wyoming over the question 
of female suffrage.50 
Popular sovereignty and equal footing, in short, had bipartisan appeal 
because they served intraparty unity.  Their durability was not the result of 
some deduction from the “structure” of the written Constitution or any 
immanent purpose allegedly lurking between that Constitution’s lines.  They 
were not derived from abstractions like equal state sovereignty.  They were 
instead the product of partisan self-interest aided by a judiciary solicitous of 
the need for Congress to delegate important matters to subnational 
constituencies.  Together with equal footing, popular sovereignty insured that 
each party within Congress could gain Senate votes from new states without 
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endangering party unity on issues over which the national or local parties 
were divided. 
C.  Understanding Constitutional Law as Credible Coalitional Commitment 
Equal footing and popular sovereignty fit a model of judicial review in 
which the Court provides Congress with a helping hand in achieving durable 
partisan coalitions.51  This model of courts and constitutions answers the 
otherwise baffling counter-majoritarian difficulty:  why would powerful 
elected politicians defer to judicial opinions or even written constitutions that 
constrain the formers’ power?52  One answer is that constitutional terms and 
judicial opinions provide focal points around which the public can rally, 
thereby overcoming obstacles to collective action that prevent a diffuse 
public from enforcing protections for their private rights.53  Another 
analogous answer is that politicians suffer from collective problems of their 
own.  They must make credible commitments to each other to keep issues off 
the agenda that could endanger their partisan organizations’ unity.  
Constitutional constraints backed by judicial review make such commitments 
more credible by giving politicians plausible political cover when challenged 
by defectors who would disrupt the commitment for immediate advantage.  
Senator Platt could rebuff Senator George Graham Vest’s effort to split the 
Republican Party over women’s suffrage precisely because popular 
sovereignty was a “sacred right” to which even conservative Republican 
voters hostile to women’s suffrage would (perhaps grudgingly) defer. 
The role of constitutional doctrine and conventions in providing political 
cover illustrates how partisan self-interest and more conventional modes of 
legal interpretation interact.  To be credible as a device for securing party 
unity, constitutional rules have to be credibly constitutional:  they have to 
have sufficient roots in popular culture that their invocation inspires respect 
rather than sneers.  Only a sacred right can provide the political cover that 
politicians need to repel provocateurs who put issues on the agenda in 
defiance of an issue-suppressing commitment.  Constitutional concepts that 
lack a sufficient pedigree in text, precedent, or history will be unable to 
anchor party unity, because those concepts will seem like efforts by one 
faction within a party to gain an advantage over another with a conveniently 
jerry-rigged principle that will be discarded once it has served its 
opportunistic purpose. 
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Equal footing and popular sovereignty, however, illustrate how this 
essential constitutional pedigree need not rest on text or original 
understanding.  These principles were created in the 1840s, more than a half 
century after the ratification of Article IV.  Nevertheless, they could form the 
basis for stable intraparty compromise because they resonated with long-
standing American political traditions that Americans could intuitively 
endorse. 
The persuasiveness of the pedigree of these concepts can be illustrated by 
contrasting them with Stephen Douglas’s utterly unsuccessful attempt to 
extend popular sovereignty to territorial legislatures.  Under this version of 
the principle, territorial legislatures created by federal statute would be 
“sovereign” over “domestic institutions” (Douglas’s code word for slavery), 
excluding direct congressional authority over such questions.  Douglas 
pressed this idea during the 1854 debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act54 on 
a gamble that Congress could admit Kansas and Nebraska while sidestepping 
a debate about permitting slavery north of the Missouri Compromise’s 
36°30´ line.  The story of how Douglas lost this bet has been told too many 
times to need recounting in detail here.55  Briefly, Douglas sponsored a bill 
in Congress to organize territorial legislatures in Kansas and Nebraska 
possessing the power to permit or forbid slavery within their limits.  Although 
Douglas masterfully steered the bill through Congress, the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act ignited a firestorm of controversy that nearly destroyed his political 
career.56 
The fiasco of Douglas’s idea of territorial legislative sovereignty 
illustrated the interdependence of constitutional principle and partisan 
necessity.  Douglas had hoped that both Southern and Northern Democrats 
would be able to sidestep their differences over slavery through a mutual 
constitutional commitment to delegate the slavery question exclusively to 
territorial legislatures.  This effort at partisan unity, however, depended on 
territorial legislatures’ being perceived by voters and politicians as 
autonomous entities separate from the Congress that created them.  
Unfortunately for Douglas, antebellum America was not prepared to accept 
any such concept of territorial government.  The problem was not that 
Douglas’s position was indefensible as a matter of text, precedent, or history.  
In these respects, Douglas’s argument was weak57 but arguably no weaker 
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than Permoli’s version of the equal footing doctrine.58  Douglas, after all, 
marshaled a lengthy political tradition in the theory’s defense.59  In 
particular, since the creation of the Wisconsin territorial government in 1836, 
Congress had conferred something like territorial home rule on territorial 
legislatures.60  Judged by the traditional canons of textualism, history, and 
precedent, therefore, Douglas’s constitutional theory was no worse than 
interpretations like Permoli that won widespread acceptance. 
The problem instead was that, in the eyes of voters, territorial governments 
and their constituents depended too much on Congress’s will and the vagaries 
of migration to insulate national politicians from blame for territorial 
legislatures’ decisions.  As Lincoln proclaimed, so long as slavery was being 
introduced into federal territory, “[w]e think that a respect for ourselves, a 
regard for future generations and for the God that made us, require that we 
put down this wrong where our votes will properly reach it.”61  Of course, if 
one accepted Douglas’s theory, Congress’s votes would not properly reach 
slavery in the territories.  Accepting that theory, however, meant accepting 
the idea that Congress could deflect responsibility from itself merely by 
delegating power to a territorial sock puppet over which the federal 
government had substantial control—a sock puppet drawing authority, in 
turn, from an arbitrary number of settlers scattered temporarily in a 
geographical location entirely of Congress’s choosing.  National politicians 
North and South accordingly ridiculed such a notion as mere “squatter 
sovereignty.”62 
By contrast, Permoli’s invocation of the rhetoric of equal footing had roots 
extending back to the Land Ordinances of the 1780s.  Likewise, popular 
sovereignty by voter referendum dated back to the ratification of the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.63  These were principles with a pedigree 
sufficient to ward off challenges to a commitment that both political parties 
had other reasons to maintain. 
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The model of constitutional law as coalitional commitment, in sum, 
suggests that partisan self-interest and conventional legal sources of authority 
are both jointly necessary but individually insufficient to sustain a durable 
constitution.  As conventional legal arguments, equal footing and popular 
sovereignty were not irresistibly persuasive.  They seemed flatly inconsistent 
with text and original understanding and, in any case, they were no more 
consistent with conventional sources of constitutional authority than 
discarded analogous concepts.  Equal footing and popular sovereignty, 
however, served to cement partisan coalitions in ways that every other 
version of the constitution of empire failed to do. 
CONCLUSION 
Our constitution for admitting new states cannot be found in the text of our 
Constitution.  It is a set of unwritten conventions and judicial doctrines 
created to manage political crises that arose during the expansion of the 
United States across a continent.  This unwritten regime is normatively a 
mixed bag, perhaps superior in some respects to the British Imperial 
Constitution insofar as our version conferred “home rule” on white and 
Protestant colonists much more quickly than did the British.  Whatever its 
normative merits or demerits, however, it has lessons to teach about how 
constitutional law is really made—not merely through founding moments in 
which plain text is popularly ratified nor from learned inferences from the 
spirit of that written law but also from partisan commitments to manage 
conflict over admission of new members.  That conflict was exacerbated by 
the high stakes of admission created by a compromise that gave new 
members the same overrepresentation in the Senate enjoyed by the original 
states.  Whatever the colonial aspirations of the Federalist Framers, those 
stakes produced an anticolonial constitution whenever the two parties 
competed for the support of settlers in the territories. 
 
